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Abstract. I consider the private provision of public goods when agents are able to make 
sequential contributions rather than simultaneous contributions. In the case of two agents 
with quasilinear utility, a quite complete analysis is possible. If the agent who likes the 
public good least gets to move first, the amount of the public good supplied will be the 
same as in the Nash equilibrium, but if the agent who likes the public good most moves 
first, less of the public good may be supplied. If the agents bid for the right to move first, 
the agent who values the public good least will always outbid the other agent. In general, 
each agent would prefer to subsidize the other agent’s contributions. If each agent chooses 
the rate at which they subsidize the other agent, the subsidizes that support the Lindahl 
allocation are the unique equilibrium subsidies. For general utility functions, I show that 
the subgame perfect equilibrium always results in less of the public good being supplied 
than does the Nash equilibrium.
Keywords, public goods, sequential games, Stackelberg equilibrium, Nash equilibrium.






















































































































































































Sequential Provision of Public Goods
Hal R. Varian
Several authors have examined the private provision of public goods in the context of a 
simultaneous move game. The Nash equilibria in these games turn out to have several 
surprising and interesting properties. For details see Warr (1983), Comes and Sandler 
(1986) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986).
As far as I know, no one has examined the Stackelberg equilibria in such games. For 
example, suppose that agents decide on their contributions to a public good sequentially, 
so that later agents know the contributions of earlier agents when they make their own 
decisions. In this sort of game, the earlier agents are able to commit to their contributions; 
such commitment is not possible in a simultaneous move game.
Admanti and Perry (1988) analyze a game in which agents alternate contributions to 
joint project. However, in their game the project is either completed or not, and no benefits 
are generated from a partially completed project. In this paper, by contrast, the focus is 
on the amount of the public good—the project— that is generated by sequential game. 
There is also a literature on sequential entry in oligopoly that contains some aspects o f the 
public good problem I examine here; see, for example, McLean and Riordan (1989).
It turns out that the ability to commit to a contribution exacerbates the free rider 
problem. Our main theorem establishes that the total amount of the public good provided 
in a sequential game is typically smaller than the amount provided in a simultaneous move 
game. Along the way, we establish several other interesting results concerning equilibria 
in sequential contribution games.
This work was supported by the National Science Foundation. I wish to thank Ted Bergstrom, Ig 
Horstman, and the participants at the Michigan-Western Ontario economic theory workshop for their 
comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank the Santa Fe Institute for their hospitality during the 




























































































1. An Example with Quasilinear Utility
It is instructive to start with a simple example. Suppose that there are two agents. Agent i 
is endowed with wealth ujj. Each agent divides his wealth between private consumption, 
x, >  0, and a contribution to a public good, p>, >  0. The total amount of the public good
is G =  <71 +  <72 •
Each agent’s utility function is linear in his private consumption and increasing and 
concave in G, so that the utility of agent i is given by
Ui(G) +  Xi =  Ui(gj +  g2) +  -  </,.
We will say that agent i likes the public good more than agent j  if tiJ(G) >  u'-(G) for 
all G >  0. This says that agent i has a uniformly higher marginal-willingness-to-pay than 
agent j  for the public good.
Let cji be the amount of the public good that maximizes agent i ’s utility function if the 
other agent contributes zero. Note that if agent i likes the public good more than agent j ,  
it follows that Qi >  gj.
We assume that Wi >  Ji; so that the wealth constraint is never binding. It is therefore 
convenient to drop wz, since it is an inessential constant in each agent’s utility function.
The Reaction Function
Let us derive the reaction function for agent 2. The first-order condition if agent 2 con­
tributes a positive amount is
“ 2(^1 +52) =  1.
Letting G2 (</i) be agent 2’s reaction function, we must have
“ 2(91 +  G2G71)) =  1.
It follows that
Gr2(fifi) — <72 — 9i-




























































































However, this derivation is correct only when agent 2 contributes a positive amount to 
the public good. Since g2 >  0, we must have
G2(gi) =  max{<72 — S i,0 }.
This “kink” in the reaction function is what makes the analysis interesting.
The Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is a point (Si,S2) such that
Si =  G i ( g 2) 
g2 =  G2(gi).
Given the simple forms of the reaction functions, we can illustrate the equilibrium in 
Figure 1. In the case depicted, agent 1 likes the public good more than agent 2; here, the 
unique Nash equilibrium is for agent 1 to contribute the entire amount of the public good. 
Agent 2 is a complete free rider. If both agents have the same tastes for the public good, 
the reaction functions coincide and there is a whole range of equilibrium contributions, 
although there is still a unique equilibrium amount of the public good.
The Stackelberg Equilibrium
We assume that agent 1 moves first. In order to investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium, 
it is useful to plot the utility of agent 1 as a function of his contribution:
Vi(Si) =  «i(Si +  G2(s i ) ) - S i
=  “ i(s i + m a x {<72 -  s i ,0 } )  -  g2.
It is easy to see that this function has the form
Vi(gi)
ui(g2) - g i  
ui(Si) — Si
for g i <  g2 
for Si >  g2.
This function is depicted in Figure 2.
It is clear by inspection that there are two possible optima: either the first agent 






























































































Figure 1. Nash equilibrium. The player who likes the public good the most contributes 
everything and the other player contributes nothing.
Case 1. The agent who likes the good least is the first contributor. In this case, the 
optimal contribution by the first agent is zero. This is true since
« i f e )  >  « 1 (9 1) >  “ l(ffi) -  31-
Case 2. The agent who likes the public good the most is the first contributor. In this 
case, either outcome can occur. The easiest way to see this is by example. Suppose 
that agent i ’s utility for the public good is u;(G) =  a^lnG. If only agent i contributes 
he will contribute a,-. Normalize <i\ — 1. If agent 1 contributes the entire amount of 
the public good, he gets a utility of In 1 — 1. If he free-rides on agent 2’s contribution, 
he gets In a2. Agent 1 will prefer to contribute when
In 1 — 1 >  In ai,




























































































u t il i ty
Figure 2. This is the utility function of the first contributor as a function of his gift. In 
the case illustrated, agent l ’s optimal action is to contribute zero, but if the “hump” were 
higher, he would want to contribute gi .
In general if the agents have tastes that are very similar, then the first agent will free 
ride on the second’s contribution. However, if the first agent likes the public good much 
more than the second, then the first agent may prefer to contribute the entire amount of 
the public good himself.
Referring to Figure 1 we see that there are two possible Stackelberg equilibria: one is 
the Nash equilibrium, in which the agent who likes the good most contributes everything. 
The other Stackelberg equilibrium is where the agent who likes the good least contributes 
everything. This equilibrium cannot arise as a Nash equilibrium since the threat to con­
tribute nothing is not credible in the simultaneous move game.
Note that it is always advantageous to move first. This is true since there are only two 
possible outcomes, gi and g 2 and the first mover gets to pick the one he prefers. That is, 
he gets to compare ui(<h) — g 1 to « 1(92)-




























































































If you want to ensure that the higher level of the public good is provided, then you should 
make sure that the person who likes the good least moves first. Of course, if you want 
to minimize the level of the public good provided, you should ensure that the person who 
likes the good most moves first.
2. Bidding for the Right to Move First
Since the first mover always has an advantage in this game, we might consider auctioning 
off the right to move first. If the first mover likes the public good much more than the 
second, then he will provide the entire amount of the public good anyway, so it is no 
advantage to him to be first mover. The advantage to the first mover only arises when the 
players have similar tastes for the public good. In this case, each player would prefer to 
move first and free ride on the others contribution.
Consider, then, the case where agent 1 likes the public good a bit more than agent 2, 
so that <ji > g2, but not too much more. That is agent 1 prefers to free ride than to 
contribute the good himself, so that
“ i f e )  > « l (s i )  - f f i .
Agent 1 can get Ui{g2) by moving first and free riding. If he moves second, he must 
contribute and he gets «i(<h) — gi- The amount that he would be willing to bid to be first, 
&i, thus solves the equation
or
bi =  Ui(g2) -  Ui(si) +  ffi- 
Similarly, the second agent’s bid would be
b2 =  u2(g i) — u2(g2) -f- g2.
Here we have assumed that the amount bid are either thrown away or given to the 
other agent. We have assumed quasilinear utility, so that there are no income effect, so it 




























































































The difference between these two bids is
b1 - b 2 =  [ « i ( j2) -  « 1 (3 1)] +  [«2(92) -  « 2(3 1)] -  [32 -  3i]- (1)
It seems plausible to suppose that the agent who values the public good more would be 
willing to pay more to move first. However, this is exactly wrong! Under our assumptions, 
the agent who values the public good least is willing to pay more for the first-mover 
position.
To see this, note that concavity of the utility functions gives us the following inequali­
ties:
« 1(82) -  « 1 (3 1) < «1(31 )[32 -  3i]
« 2(82) -  « 2(3 1 ) <  « 2(31)[32 -  3i]- 
Substituting these into (1) we have
61 -  62 < [«1 (3 1) +  « 2(3 1 ) -  1](32 - 3 i )- 
Since u l(3i)  =  1, this simplifies to
bi -  b2 <  «1(32)[32 -  3i] <  0,
where the last inequality follows since g 1 >  g2.
It follows that 61 <  i 2 • That is, the agent who likes the public good the least will be 
willing to pay the most in order to move first. As we’ve seen, this will ensure that the 
largest amount of the public good will be provided.
Essentially each agent is paying for the right to free ride on the other agent. And it 
is certainly better to free ride on someone who will provide a lot of the public good than 
someone who will provide only a little. Hence the agent who likes the public good the least 





























































































3. Subsidizing the Other Agent
Suppose that a subsidy is offered to one of the agents in a simultaneous-move public goods 
contribution game. Roberts (1987) and Bergstrom (1989) have shown that typically each 
agent would prefer that the other agent receives the subsidy. In the Roberts-Bergstrom 
framework, the subsidy is paid for by a lump-sum tax on both agents.
The application of this observation in our framework is rather nice. The general idea 
is easiest to see in the case where the agents have identical utility functions for the public 
good, u(G).
Consider first, what happens without any subsidies. In this case, the Nash equilibrium 
amount of the public good is determined by the condition
u'(Gn) =  1.
Any set of contributions {g " ,g ")  such that <?" +  3 "  =  Gn constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose now that agent 1 offers to subsidize agent 2 with a subsidy s2. This means 
that the cost to agent 2  if he contributes g2 is (1 — s2)g2, while agent 1 must pay the 
subsidy amount of «2 <72'
Suppose that agent 1 offers a tiny subsidy to agent 2. Then in the unique Nash 
equilibrium agent 2 will contribute the entire amount of the public good himself. Let this 
amount be denoted by G(s2); it is defined by the equation
U2(G(s2)) =  1 — •82-
Agent l ’s utility from offering this subsidy is
ui(G(«2)) — 52 G ( s2).
Originally agent 1 had utility u i(G ") — <7" =  Ui(G(0)) — g". Hence the increase in 
utility from offering the subsidy is
Ul(G(s2 )) — Uj(G(0)) +  <7"  — S2G(«2)-
As «2 approaches zero, this expression converges to g” . Hence as long as agent 2 is not 
contributing the entire amount originally, so that g” > 0, it follows that there is a small 




























































































The intuition is the following: if agent 1 offers a very tiny subsidy to agent 2, agent 2 will 
end up contributing the entire amount of the public good in the resulting Nash equilibrium. 
But a tiny subsidy hardly costs agent 1 anything. Hence he is always better off offering 
the subsidy.
Note that this is a stronger result th^t proved by Roberts (1987) and Bergstrom (1989). 
He showed that each agent preferred that the other agent be subsidized if the subsidy was 
paid by an equal lump sum tax. We have shown that each agent prefers to subsidize the 
other agent even if he must pay the entire amount of the subsidy himself. However, they 
were concerned with more general form of preferences than those examined here.
4. Equilibrium Subsidies
We have seen that each agent will prefer to subsidize the other agent in our contribution 
game. It is natural to ask for the equilibrium level of subsidization. Suppose that each 
agent simultaneously names a rate at which he is willing to subsidize the other agent. 
Then, given these subsidy rates, the agents play a simultaneous contribution game. What 
axe the equilibrium value of the subsidies?
In order to investigate this question, let us first examine the Pareto efficient level of 
provision of the public good. This is the level of the public good, G =  g\ +  g2, that solves 
the problem
max ui(ffi +  g2) +  u2(ffi +  9i) -  9i -  9 i■
01 >02
Hence the Pareto efficient amount of the public good satisfies
ui(G ') +  u'(G ‘ ) =  l. (2)
This is just the familiar condition that the sum of the marginal willingnesses-to-pay must 
equal marginal cost.
Returning to the contribution game, suppose that agent i has his contributions subsi­
dized by the amount s,. Then if the subsidies are chosen to satisfy the conditions
« i ( G f ) = 1 - » ;





























































































the Pareto efficient level of the public good will be provided. The subsidy rates here are 
effectively playing the role of Lindahl prices; exploiting this analogy, we will refer to the 
subsidies defined in equation (3) as the Lindahl subsidies.
Note that (2) and (3) together imply
si +  s2 =  1- (4)
Now suppose that the subsidy rates are chosen independently by the agents, each agent 
recognizing that once the subsidy rates are chosen they will play a Nash contribution game. 
What subsidy rates will be chosen in equilibrium?
T h eorem  1. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium o f the subsidy setting game involves 
setting the subsidy rates to be the Lindahl subsidies.
Proof. Here we show that the efficient subsidies are equilibrium subsidies. The proof that 
the equilibrium is unique involves investigating several cases and is given in the appendix.
Suppose that the subsidies are the Lindahl subsidies. Then there is a whole range of 
Nash equilibria, namely any pair (<?",<?£) such that g" +  g" — Ge. This is because any 
such pair will satisfy the appropriate first-order conditions given in (3). Suppose we have 
settled on some such equilibrium (g", g" ). We need to show that neither agent would want 
to increase or decrease the subsidy that they offer to the other agent.
1. Would agent 1 want to increase his subsidy to agent 2?
If agent 1 increases his subsidy to S2 from s|, agent 2 will end up contributing the 
entire amount of the public good. Let G(s2) be the amount that results as a function of 
the subsidy rate. Of course G(s|) =  Ge.
By concavity of the utility function
ul(G(s2)) -  Ul(G e) <  u;(G ')[G (s2) -  G '].
Using the fact that u[(G e) =  1 — s* =  s|, and that Ge =  g" +  g% we can write this 
inequality as
u,(G (s2)) -  s\G{s2) < ui(G e) -  (1 -  sS)Ge





























































































Using the fact that s2 >  s|, we have
Ul((?(s2)) — S2G(S2) <  Ul(G(s2)) — s|G(s2)- (6)
Combining (5) and (6), we have
U ,(G M ) -  S2G(S2) <  « l (G ')  -  (1 -  s J K  -  4ff2-
The left-hand side of this inequality is the utility that agent 1 gets if he chooses s2 > s\. 
The right-hand side is the utility he gets at the original Nash equilibrium. Hence, agent 1 
will not wish to increase the subsidy rate that he offers to agent 2 .
2. Would agent 1 want to decrease his subsidy to agent 2?
If agent 1 decreases his subsidy to agent 2, agent 1 will end up contributing the entire 
amount of the public good. Indeed, he will contribute the same amount that agent 2 was 
contributing. This will give him a utility of u i(G ') — (1 — s\)Ge and we need to compare 
this to his original utility, « i (G e) — (1 — ■s')#" — «Iff?•
Note that
(1 -  s\)G' =  (1 -  st)(g?  +  ff2" )  =  (1 -  s ' M  +  -S rf.
Hence
ui(G c) -  (1 -  s ;)G e =  m (G e) -  (1 -  -  491-
llence agent l ’s utility does not increase if he decreases his subsidy to agent 2 .
The arguments for agent 2 are parallel. Hence neither agent would want to change 
their subsidy rates to the other agent, and the pair (.sj, s2) ' s a Nash equilibrium. I
An Intuitive Example
The intuition behind this result is not too difficult, at least in the case of identical pref­
erences. If preferences are identical, then the person who has the lowest cost of providing 
the public good will provide all of it. If agent 1 subsidizes agent 2’s contributions, then he 
reduces agent 2’s cost of giving. This agent 1 to free ride on agent 2.
For example, if agent 1 contributes directly to the public good, it costs him a dollar 




























































































subsidy, then it costs agent 1 only ten cents for each dollar that agent 2 contributes to the 
public good. This is obviously preferable!
Each agent will continue to subidize the other until the marginal cost of contributing 
directly is equal to the marginal cost of contributing indirectly— that is, by subsidizing the 
other agent. In the case of identical consumers, this is where each agent gives the other 
a fifty percent subsidy. But in the case of identical consumers, this is simply the Lindahl 
price!
Related literature
Hurwicz (1979) investigates the problem implementing the Lindahl equilibrium as a Nash 
equilibrium for general preferences, but he requires a much more complicated “penalty” for 
deviating from the equilibrium choice. Also, the Hurwicz outcome function is not feasible 
away from equilibrium.
These difficulties do not arise in our framework. In the context of quasilinear utility, 
the penalty for deviation from the Lindahl prices is “automatic” in that deviations from 
the Lindahl prices immediately imply that one agent free rides on the other.
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1976), (1979) describe a demand revealing process that yields 
the Pareto optimal amount of the public good. However the Clarke-Groves mechanisms 
are not generally Pareto efficient in that they may require some payment of the private 
good. The mechanism that we propose is fully efficient.
In Varian (1989) I describe a related mechanism that works for n agents with general 
utility functions; i.e., preferences are not restricted to the quasilinear form. The related 
mechanism also has two stages. In the first stage each agent announces a “price” for each 
other agent. In the second stage, each agent contributes to the public good, and the cost of 
his contribution depends on the price determined in the first stage. Each agent also bears 
an additional cost which depends on the other agents’ contributions and on the dispersion 





























































































5. General Utility Functions
The quasilinear case is very special. Suppose that we now consider a general utility function 
u,(G, X j )  where G is the level o f the public good and x; is the private consumption of agent i. 
As before, we assume that utility is a differentiable, strictly concave function.
We first derive the form of the reaction function. Agent 2’s maximization problem is
max u2(gi +  g2,x 2)
* 2 .9 2
such that <72 +  X2 =  w2 
<72 >  0.
We can add g\ to each side of the constraints in this problem and use the definition 
G =  g\ +  <72 to rewrite this problem as
max u2(<5, X2)
x? ,G
such that G +  x2 =  w2 +  gi 
G > < 7,.
In this interpretation, agent 2 is in effect choosing the level of the public good, subject 
to the constraint that the level that he chooses is at least as large as that contributed by 
agent 1.
Following Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) we note that this problem is simply 
a standard consumer demand problem except for the inequality constraint. Let f 2(w) be 
agent 2’s Engel function for the public good as a function of his wealth. This is the function 
that gives the optimal level of G for agent 2, holding prices fixed at (1,1) and letting wealth 
vary. It follows that
G =  gi +(72 =  m ax{/2(tc2 +  Si),S i}-
Subtracting <71 from each side of this equation, we have the reaction function
<52(s i ) =  max{/2(ic2 +  Si) - 5i , 0}.
The reaction function for agent 1 has the simple interpretation that agent 1 will con­
tribute the amount of the public good that he would demand if his wealth were uq +  g2 




























































































This expression for the reaction function is useful since we know quite a bit about 
the behavior of Engel functions. For example, it is quite natural to make the following 
assumption:
Assum ption . Both the public and the private good are strictly normal goods at all levels 
of wealth. It follows that 1 >  //(to) >  0.
Given this assumption it is easy to see the general shape of the reaction function. 
Consider the reaction function for agent 2. When g\ =  0, agent 2 will contribute / :2 0'“2 )■ 
As gi increases, the contribution of agent 2 will decrease, less than one-for-one. If //(tr ) 
is bounded away from zero, then there will be some contribution by agent 1, gf, at which 
/ 2(r/22 +  9i) — 9i — 0 and agent 1 will contribute nothing. This amount, g ,̂ is the amount 
where agent l ’s contribution just crowds out agent 2’s contribution.
We summarize some properties of the reaction function in the following fact, the proof 
of which follows immediately from the assumption.
Fact 1. The reaction function G2(<7i ) is a nonincreasing function. It will be strictly 
decreasing when it is not equal to zero. The function H (gi) =  <jq +  G2(ffi) is a strictly 
increasing function.
As before, we can use this reaction function to calculate the Nash equilibria and the 
Stackelberg equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a solution to the following equa­
tions
gi" =  m ax{/i(t»i +  ff?) -  ff?,0}
52 =  m ax{/2(ic2 +  g ")  -  ff",0}.
A Stackelberg equilibrium is a pair (gj, G2(<?()) in which g\ solves
max +  m ax{/2(u>2 + ffi)  -  Si,0},tt>i -  sn).
Our main interest is in comparing the solutions of these two sets of equations. This 
comparison is made simpler by noting that Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) have 
proved that under the normality assumption we have made there is a unique Nash equi­




























































































6. A  Cobb-Douglas Example
A useful example to fix ideas is the Cobb-Douglas case:
Ui(G, X j) =  a.i ln(<7i +  52) +  ( 1  -  a {) ln(uq -  5,),
where 0 <  a, <  1. In this case the agent spends a constant fraction a * of his wealth on the 
public good so that the reaction function for agent i takes the form
Gi(gj) =  max{a,(M>j +  5; )  -  5>,0}.
Here the slope of the reaction function is cq — 1 up to the point 5J =  a,u>i/( 1 — a;), the 
point where agent j ’s contribution just crowds out agent i ’s contribution. After this point, 
agent i contributes zero. It is worth noting that the reaction function will have this form 
for any homothetic utility function.
Nash equilibria are the solutions to
51 =  max{ai(tci + g2) -  52,0}
52 =  max{a2(«’2 + 5 i) - $ 1 , 0}.
The Stackelberg equilibrium is the solution to
max a\ ln(5 i +  max{a2(ti>2 +  Si) -  $1 , 0} )  +  (1 -  ai)ln(uq -  5 1).Si
Straightforward computations show that the interior solutions to these equations imply 
equilibrium levels of the public good of
Qn _  ° i ° 2(mi + w 2)
O-l 0,2 ~ O1 CL2
Gs =  aia2(«q +  102)-
Note that in this example, Gn > Gs since a; <  1 .
7. Results for General Utility Functions
We have three sets of results. The first set of results concerns who contributes and who 
free rides. The second set of results concerns the effect of redistributions of wealth. The 
third set of results concerns how the amount of the public good provided in the Stackelberg 
equilibrium compares to the amount provided in the Nash equilibrium.
Recall that 5,- denotes the optimal contribution of agent i if the other person contributes 
nothing and that g\ is defined by / 2(u>2 + 5i) =  5i! this is the level o f 51 at which agent l ’s 





























































































Fact 2. If fji <  <7i then both agents must contribute in the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
Proof. Evaluate the right derivative of agent l ’s utility function at gf. We have
0M gr,«>i - g i )  _  fa ite b w i - 9 i )  n 
dG dxi
The inequality follows since the derivative equals zero at gi, and g\ >  <j\. (Recall that 
ut(g1, w1 — gi) is a concave function.) It follows that agent 1’s utility will increase if he 
contributes less than g\, even if he is the only one to contribute. The fact that the other 
agent will also contribute can only increase the first agent’s utility. Hence the Stackelberg 
equilibrium must involve contributions by both agents. I
Fact 3. If there is a Nash equilibrium with g”  — 0, then this is also a Stackelberg equi­
librium.
Proof. By definition of Nash equilibrium, agent 2 is on his reaction curve, so we only need 
to show that agent 1 is optimized. If agent 1 contributes 0, then agent 2 must contribute 
32- Let 3i > 0 be any other possible contribution by agent 1. Then we have :
ui(g2,w i) >  ui(at + S 2 ,^ i  — g i) >  « i(g i +  G2(g\),w1 -  gj).
The first inequality follows from the Nash assumption. The second inequality follows since 
G2{0) =  <?2 and G2(gi) is a nonincreasing function. I
Wealth Redistribution
Fact 4. Suppose that we have a Stackelberg equilibrium (gf,g|). Let (Auq, Atu2) be a 
redistribution o f wealth such that gi > A uq fori =  1,2. Then the Stackelberg equilibrium 
after this redistribution is (gf +  Auq,g| +  A iu2) and the total amount o f  the public good 
remains unchanged.
Proof. Note that the requirement that g; >  Au;, implies that the assumptions can only be 
satisfied when each person is contributing a positive amount. The first-order condition for 
an optimum is
dui(gi +  g2,u>i — Si) r /, , N d«i(ffi +  g2,w 1 - g i )  „




























































































Now suppose that each agent changes his contribution by the amount of his wealth change 
so that Agi =  Auq for i =  1,2. Note that since Aui, +  A uj2 =  0 we must have Agi +  Aÿ2 =  
0.
Under this rule none of the arguments of any of the functions in the first-order condition 
change. The conclusion follows immediately. I
Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) show that essentially the same 
result holds in an (interior) Nash equilibrium. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) also 
investigate the boundary cases in some detail. In the two-agent context we are investigating 
here the analysis of the boundary cases are quite straightforward.
Fact 5. Suppose that person 1 is contributing and person 2 is not. Then a redistribution 
from 2 to 1 will increase the amount o f the public good, while a redistribution from 1 to 
2 can decrease or increase the amount o f  the public good.
Proof. A distribution from 2 to 1 increases the amount of the public good since /i(u q ) 
is an increasing function. Since g2 is equal to zero it will remain zero at lower levels of 
wealth.
A redistribution from 1 to 2 will decrease the level of the public good for small redis­
tributions by the monotonicity of f i  {u'\). But when w 1 gets small enough relative to it'2 , 
it can easily happen that person 2 starts to contribute, thereby increasing the amount of 
the public good. I
Fact 6. Suppose that person 2 is contributing and person 1 is not. Then a transfer from 
1 to 2 will increase the level o f the public good, while a transfer from 2 to 1 can increase 
or decrease the level o f  the public good.
Proof. A transfer from 1 to 2 will increase the level o f the public good by the monotonic­
ity of / 2(u>2)i and a larger contribution by person 2 will never induce agent 1 to begin 
contributing.
A small transfer of wealth from 2 to 1 will decrease the level of the public good, but a 




























































































Our main result has to do with the comparison of the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria.
T h eorem  2. The amount of the public good contributed by agent 1 in the Stackelberg 
equilibrium is never larger than the amount provided by agent 1 in the Nash equilibrium. 
That is, g\ < g " .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume the theorem is not true so that g[ >  g[‘ . 
We consider two cases, first when agent 2 contributes zero in the Nash equilibrium, and 
second, where agent 2 makes a positive contribution in the Nash equilibrium.
Case 1. gJ =  0.
Since f?2(<7" )  =  0 and is a nonincreasing function, we also have =  0.
Now, by the Nash assumption and the strict concavity of the utility function,
« 1 (9" , ~ 9 i )  >  ~ 9 i )  =  +  <32(sJ),u;i - y j ) -
It follows that agent l ’s utility must decrease when moving from y”  to gf which means 
that g{ cannot be a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Case 2. G i(g") >  0..
First, we observe that since C?2(s i) is strictly decreasing in this case, the assumption 
that gl >  y" implies
G2(9ls) <  (?2(sD  =  9?■
Rearranging this inequality,
* =  9" ~ G2{g[) >  0. (7)
Second, we know that agent 1 must get at least as large a utility at the Stackelberg 
equilibrium as at the Nash equilibrium so:
ui (ff" +  9? ~ 9 i)  =  “ i (9" +  G i(g"),w i — g") <  ui (g ’  +  G2 (g {),w i — yj). (8)
The fact that utility is increasing in the amount of the public good and that e > 0 
implies:
ui(9? +  <?2(0i)>u’i — 9i) <  ui(9i +  ^ 2(9*) +  — 9*)- (9)




























































































Combining (8) and (9), and using (7) for the definition of e,
« 1 (9"  +ff2»u,i - S i )  <  «i(»J +  9"<wl - S i ) -
But this contradicts the assumption that (<?” , g") *s a Nash equilibrium. I
Corollary. The total amount o f the public good in the Stackelberg equilibrium is less 
than or equal to the total amount provided in the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. According to Fact 1, the function / / ( g i ) — <j.: 4- G2(g i) is an increasing function. 
Therefore,
H (g") =  gf +  G2(g?) =  sr +  Sr >  Si +  G2(s?) =  #(*?)■
The corollary follows. I
8. Incom plete Inform ation
Our analysis has concerned the case where each agent knows the preferences and wealth 
of the other agent. One could also consider a model with incomplete information in which 
one or both of the agents does not know these things for certain.
The second agent reacts passively, making his optimal choice given the first agent’s 
contribution. Hence it is irrelevant whether or not he knows anything about the first 
agent. The only interesting uncertainty concerns the first agent’s knowledge of the second 
agent’s type.
Consider the quasilinear model examined earlier. In this case all that is relevant from 
agent l ’s point of view is the value of g2. Regard g2 as a random variable with some 
probability density function / ( s 2) and suppose that agent 1 seeks to maximize expected 
utility.1
Suppose that g2 is distributed between 0 and oo. The expected utility of agent 1 is 
given by
v i (g i )=  /  H ffi + m ax{g2 -  g i,0 }) -  g !]f(g2)dg2,
Jo
1 We assume that the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function takes the quasilinear form. This is 




























































































which can be written as
r9\ r°°
v (9 i )=  /  [u (9i)~  9 i]f(9 2 )d h +  /  H <72)-9i]/(S2)d92-
JO Jgi
Letting F(g) be the cumulative distribution function for / ,  we can write this as
v(gi) =  K ffi) -  SiIjFXsj) +  /  Hff2) -  9\]}{9i)dg2■
Jgi
Differentiating this expression with respect to gi we have
u!( s i)  =  M < / i)  - s i] /(ff i)  +  K ( s i )  -  il-f’(s i)  -  M s O  - 9 i\f(gi)  -  f  f ( g 2 ) ^ 2 .
J91
Simplifying gives us
«'1(9 1) =  “ UffO-FXsi) - 1-
Note that when g\ =  0, the probability that § 2  is less than this is zero, so that u((0) =  —1. 
If g 1 is large enough so that agent 1 is certain that g2 is less than <71, then v'1(g1) =  uj(<7i ) —1. 
Hence, agent l ’s utility as a function of his gift is similar to the shape depicted in Figure 2. 
Depending on the beliefs of agent 1 about agent 2’s maximum contribution, agent 1 will 
either choose to free ride, or to contribute an amount g* that satisfies the condition
This marginal condition is quite intuitive. If agent 1 decides to contribute a bit more of 
the public good, he will get u[(g*), but only if agent 2 has g2 < g*. Otherwise, agent 1 will 
get no incremented utility from his contribution—since his contribution would just crowd 
out some of the public good that agent 2 would have given anyway. Hence the expected 
marginal utility of agent l ’s contribution is u[(g*) times the probability that g2 < gi, 
which is just u[(gi)F (g*). The optimal contribution is determined by the condition that 
this expected marginal utility must equal the (certain) marginal cost of the contribution.
How does this amount compare to <71, which is what agent 1 would contribute under 
certainty? Note that y'j(gi) =  )F(<?i) — 1 =  F (g j) — 1. As long as there is some
possibility that agent 2 will have g2 > gi, we will have F (gi) <  1 and «i(ffi) will be 




























































































concave shape for Vi(gi ) this implies that the equilibrium contribution in the presence of 
uncertainty is less than the contribution under certainty.
Intuitively, the possibility that agent 2 may value the good more than agent 1 leads 
agent 1 to reduce his contribution to the public good, hoping to free ride on agent 2’s 
contribution.
9. Sum m ary
We have examined some sequential games involving contributions to a public good. If 
preferences are quasilinear, then:
1. The sequential equilibrium of the contribution game will provide the same or less of 
the public good than the simultaneous move game. This is also true for general utility 
functions.
2. The player who likes the public good least will bid the most to move first.
3. Each player would like to subsidize the other player’s contributions. If both players 
choose subsidy rates and then play the voluntary contribution game, a Lindahl equi­
librium is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game.
4. The equilibrium of the sequential move game is independent of small redistributions of 
wealth.
5. If the first agent is uncertain about the type of the second agent, he will tend to 




























































































Consider any subsidies (sj,s|) other than the efficient subsidies. We need to show that 
there is some action by one of the agents that will increase his utility. Given (s*, «2)1 there 
will be some amount G* =  g* +  g2 of the public good provided, and agent 1 will get utility
ttl( G * ) - ( l - « î ) r f - « Î 9 Î -  (10)
There are several cases to consider.
Case 1. The equilibrium amount of the public good is less than the efficient amount: 
G* <  G‘  and both agents are contributing.
Since G* provides less than the efficient amount of the public good,
u'i(G*) +  t 4 (G * )> l ,
which means that
1 — s* -f~ 1 — $2 ^  1> 
or
l - s ^ - s ^ X ) .  (11)
Suppose that agent 1 increases his subsidy on agent 2 to some amount s2 >  sîl • Then in 
the contribution stage of the game, agent 2 will contribute the entire amount of the public 
good, which we denote by G( s 2 ).
Agent 1 will then get utility Ui (G(s2 )) — ^ G ^ ) -  The difference between this utility 
and the utility at (s*,.^ ) given in equation (10) is:
ul(G(s2)) — S2G(S2) — Ui(G*) +  (1 — « î ) ^  +  ■S2ÜI2- (12)
Let s2 approach sj. Since G(.s2 ) is a continuous function of , expression (12) converges
to
—SjG* +  (1 — +  SjSÎ- (13)
Substituting G* =  gl +  g2 and simplifying, we have
(1 -  ~  4)9*■




























































































Using equation (11) and the fact that g* >  0, we have
Hence, a subsidy level s2 that is slightly larger than s2 will increase the utility of agent 1.
Case 2. The equilibrium amount of the public good is less than the efficient amount and 
one agent contributes zero.
Suppose that agent 1 is contributing a positive amount and agent 2 is contributing 
zero. This means that u'2(G*) <  1 — s2. Let agent 1 increase his subsidy of agent 2 up to 
the point where agent 2 is just willing to contribute. That is, agent 1 increases agent 2’s 
subsidy to •s2’ , where s2* satisfies
u'2(G ") =  1 - 4 * .
In doing this, agent l ’s utility doesn’t change. Now let agent 1 increase the subsidy to 
some amount s2 slightly beyond s2*, and let s2 approach s2*. According to equation (13), 
the limit of the change in utility is given by
-*;•<?*+  ( i - * I ) r f  +  «5s;. ( 14 )
Since g2 =  0, and g* =  G*, this expression becomes
(1 - s j  - s ? ) G '  >  0-
The last inequality follows since we have an inefficiently small amount of the public good, 
so that u'j(G*) +  u2(G*) <  1.
Case S. The equilibrium amount of the public good is more than the efficient amount: 
G* >  Ge and both agents are contributing.
In this case, the argument we used to derive equation (11) implies that
1 -  s\ -  s j <  0. (15)
Suppose that agent 1 considers cutting the subsidy to agent 2 to some s2 slightly smaller 




























































































changed, he will contribute the entire amount of the public good G*, giving him utility 
u(G*) — (1 — Si)G*. The increase in agent l ’s utility is given by
-  (1 -  aI)G* -  «i(G*) + (1 -  -I)»T + 4gl
Using the fact that G* =  <7* +  <?2, we can simplify this expression to
«  +  s2*  -  i K  >  o ,
where the inequality follows from equation (15).
Case 4- The equilibrium amount of the public good is more than the efficient amount: 
G* > Ge and one agent contributes zero.
Suppose that agent 1 contributes zero. Then agent 1 has utility
tii(G M )) -  s*2G(s*2) =  Ul(G*) -  s; g \  (16)
Since we have an inefficiently large amount of the public good being provided,
■«i(G*) + «i(G*)<l.
Since agent 2 is contributing, we can write
tii(G*) +  l - * *  < 1 ,  
or,
u'j(G*) — «2 < 0. (17)
Differentiate equation (16) with respect to s2 and evaluate the derivative at s2:
U1(G*) — s2]G'(s °o(G*) -  s2 < 0.
Differentiate equation (16) with respect to $2 and evaluate the derivative at sj:
K (G *)-*;]G 'W )-G (-5).
The bracketed term is negative by equation (17). The derivative G '(s2) is positive since 
increasing the subsidy on an agent who is contributing must increase his contribution. 
Hence the sign of the entire expression is negative.
This means that agent l ’s utility must decrease if he increAes his subsidy of agent 2 
by a small amount. Conversely, agent l ’s utility will increase if he decreases his subsidy of 
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